Voting procedures under a restricted domain an examination of the (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to five main paradoxes /
"This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in...
| Main Author: | Felsenthal, Dan S., |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Nurmi, Hannu,, SpringerLink (Online service) |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cham, Switzerland :
Springer,
[2019]
|
| Physical Description: |
1 online resource (x, 92 pages). |
| Series: |
SpringerBriefs in economics.
|
| Subjects: |
Table of Contents:
- 20 voting procedures designed to elect a single candidate
- The (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to lack of monotonicity in a restricted domain
- The (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to the inconsistency paradox (aka reinforcement paradox) in a restricted domain
- The (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to the no-show paradox in a restricted domain
- Which of the 20 voting procedures satisfy or violate the subset choice condition (scc) in a restricted domain?
- The (in)vulnerability of 20 voting procedures to the preference inversion paradox in a restricted domain.