Efficient inter-carrier compensation for competing networks when customers share the value of a call
Saved in:
Main Author: | DeGraba, Patrick J. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | United States. Federal Trade Commission. Bureau of Economics. |
Format: | Electronic |
Language: | English |
Published: |
[Washington, D.C.] :
[Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission],
[2002]
|
Physical Description: |
29 pages : digital, PDF file. |
Series: |
Working paper (United States. Federal Trade Commission. Bureau of Economics) ;
no. 251. |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: |
https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/LPS95275 |
In Prospector
Similar Items
-
Naked exclusion by a dominant supplier exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts
by: DeGraba, Patrick J.
Published: (2010) -
Reconciling the off-net cost pricing principle with efficient network utilization
by: DeGraba, Patrick J.
Published: (2003) -
Volume discounts, loss leaders, and competition for more profitable customers
by: DeGraba, Patrick J.
Published: (2003) -
Data brokers : a call for transparency and accountability
by: United States. Federal Trade Commission,
Published: (2014) -
P2P file-sharing evaluate the risks
Published: (2008)