Critical infrastructure protection in homeland security defending a networked nation /
| Main Author: | Lewis, T. G. 1941- |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Ebooks Corporation. |
| Format: | eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Hoboken, New Jersey :
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
2015.
|
| Physical Description: |
1 online resource (xix, 376 pages). |
| Edition: | Second edition. |
| Series: |
Ebook Library (EBL)
|
| Subjects: |
| Item Description: |
Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index. Machine generated contents note: pt. I ORIGINS OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION POLICY -- 1. Origins of Critical Infrastructure Protection -- 1.1. Recognition -- 1.2. Natural Disaster Recovery -- 1.3. Definitional Phase -- 1.4. Public-Private Cooperation -- 1.5. Federalism: Whole of Government -- 1.6. Infrastructure Protection within DHS -- 1.7. Implementing a Risk Strategy -- 1.7.1. Risk-Informed Decision-Making -- 1.7.2. Resilience-Informed Decision-Making -- 1.7.3. Prevention or Response? -- 1.8. Analysis -- 1.8.1. PPP Conundrum -- 1.8.2. Information-Sharing Conundrum -- 1.8.3. Climate Change Conundrum -- 1.8.4. Funding Conundrum -- 1.8.5. Spend 80% on 20% of the Country -- 1.9. Exercises -- References -- pt. II THEORY AND FOUNDATIONS -- 2. Risk Strategies -- 2.1. EUT -- 2.1.1. Threat -- Asset Pairs -- 2.2. PRA and Fault Trees -- 2.2.1. An Example: Your Car -- 2.3. MBRA and Resource Allocation -- 2.3.1. Another Example: Redundant Power. 2.4. PRA in the Supply Chain -- 2.5. Protection versus Response -- 2.6. Threat is an Output -- 2.7. Bayesian Belief Networks -- 2.8. A BN for Threat -- 2.9. Risk of a Natural Disaster -- 2.10. Earthquakes -- 2.11. Black Swans and Risk -- 2.12. Black Swan Floods -- 2.13. Are Natural Disasters Getting Worse? -- 2.14. Black Swan Al Qaeda Attacks -- 2.15. Black Swan Pandemic -- 2.16. Risk and Resilience -- 2.17. Exercises -- References -- 3. Theories of Catastrophe -- 3.1. NAT -- 3.2. Blocks and Springs -- 3.3. Bak's Punctuated Equilibrium Theory -- 3.4. TOC -- 3.4.1. State Space Diagram -- 3.5. U.S. Electric Power Grid -- 3.6. POE -- 3.6.1. Great Recessions -- 3.6.2. Too Much Money -- 3.7. Competitive Exclusion -- 3.7.1. Gause's Law -- 3.7.2. Self-Organizing Internet -- 3.7.3. A Monoculture -- 3.8. POR -- 3.9. Resilience of Complex Infrastructure Systems -- 3.9.1. Expected Utility and Risk -- 3.9.2. SOC -- 3.9.3. TOC -- 3.9.4. POE and nonlinearity -- 3.9.5. CEP and loss of redundancy -- 3.9.6. POR and percolation. 3.10. Emergence -- 3.10.1. Opposing Forces in Emergent CIKR -- 3.11. Exercises -- References -- 4. Complex CIKR Systems -- 4.1. CIKR as Networks -- 4.1.1. Emergence -- 4.1.2. Classes of CIKR Networks -- 4.1.3. Self-Organized Networks -- 4.2. Cascading CIKR Systems -- 4.2.1. Fundamental Resilience Equation -- 4.2.2. Targeted Attacks -- 4.3. Network Row Resilience -- 4.4. Paradox of Redundancy -- 4.4.1. Link Percolation and Robustness -- 4.4.2. Node Percolation and Robustness -- 4.4.3. Blocking Nodes -- 4.5. Network Risk -- 4.5.1. Crude Oil and KeystoneXL -- 4.5.2. MBRA Network Resource Allocation -- 4.6. Exercises -- Reference -- pt. III INDIVIDUAL SECTORS -- 5. Communications -- 5.1. Early Years -- 5.2. Regulatory Structure -- 5.3. Architecture of the Communication Sector -- 5.3.1. Physical Infrastructure -- 5.3.2. Wireless Networks -- 5.3.3. Extraterrestrial Communication -- 5.3.4. LESs -- 5.3.5. Cellular Networks -- 5.3.6. Generations -- 5.3.7. Wi-Fi Technology -- 5.4. Risk Analysis -- 5.4.1. Importance of Carrier Hotels. 5.4.2. Network Analysis -- 5.4.3. Flow Analysis -- 5.4.4. Robustness -- 5.4.5. HPM Attacks -- 5.5. Cellular Network Threats -- 5.5.1. Cyber Threats -- 5.5.2. HPM-Like Threats -- 5.5.3. Physical Threats -- 5.6. Analysis -- 5.7. Exercises -- References -- 6. Internet -- 6.1. Internet as a Disruptive Technology -- 6.2. Autonomous System Network -- 6.2.1. AS500 Network -- 6.3. Origins of TCP/IP -- 6.3.1. DNS Basics -- 6.4. Internet Standards -- 6.4.1. Email -- 6.4.2. TCP/IP -- 6.5. Toward Commercialization -- 6.6. WWW -- 6.7. Internet Governance -- 6.7.1. IAB and IETF -- 6.7.2. ICANN Wars -- 6.7.3. ISOC -- 6.7.4. W3C -- 6.7.5. A Final Example -- 6.8. Analysis -- 6.9. Exercises -- References -- 7. Cyber Threats -- 7.1. Script Kiddies and Black-Hats -- 7.1.1. Script-Kiddies -- 7.1.2. Black-Hats -- 7.1.3. Weaponized Exploits -- 7.2. Tools of the Trade -- 7.2.1. First Exploit -- 7.2.2. TCP/IP Flaws -- 7.2.3. Open Ports -- 7.2.4. Buffer Overflow Exploits -- 7.2.5. DDoS Attacks -- 7.2.6. E-mail Exploits. 7.2.7. Flawed Application and System Software -- 7.3. Botnets -- 7.4. Cyber Risk Analysis -- 7.5. Cyber Infrastructure Risk -- 7.5.1. Blocking Node Analysis -- 7.6. Analysis -- 7.7. Exercises -- References -- 8. Information Technology -- 8.1. Principles of IT Security -- 8.2. Enterprise Systems -- 8.2.1. Loss of Service -- 8.2.2. Loss of Data -- 8.2.3. Loss of Security -- 8.3. Cyber Defense -- 8.3.1. Authenticate Users -- 8.3.2. Tp -- 8.3.3. Inside the DMZ -- 8.4. Basics of Encryption -- 8.4.1. DES -- 8.4.2. 3DES -- 8.4.3. AES -- 8.5. Asymmetric Encryption -- 8.5.1. Public Key Encryption -- 8.6. RSA Illustrated -- 8.7. PKI -- 8.7.1. Definition of PKI -- 8.7.2. Certificates -- 8.8. Countermeasures -- 8.9. Exercises -- References -- 9. Cybersecurity Policy -- 9.1. A National Priority and a (Familiar) Call to Arms -- 9.1.1. Infrastructure as Target: From Hypothetical Concern to a Growing Threat -- 9.1.2. A Difficult Terrain: Convergence, Attribution, and the Production of Cyber Weapons -- 9.2. Rewriting Cybersecurity Policy: The Difficulty of Reform. 9.2.1. A False Start: The Cybersecurity Act of 2012 -- 9.2.2. EO 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity -- 9.2.3. NIST Framework: The Peril and the Promise of Voluntary Standards -- 9.2.4. ECS: The Possibilities and Limits of Information Sharing -- 9.3. Cybersecurity, Critical Infrastructure, and Public Policy: An Ongoing -- and Difficult -- Evolution -- 9.3.1. Policy Options: Looking Forward -- 9.4. Exercises -- References -- 10. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition -- 10.1. What is SCADA? -- 10.2. SCADA versus Enterprise Computing Differences -- 10.3. Common Threats -- 10.4. Who is in Charge? -- 10.5. SCADA Everywhere -- 10.6. SCADA Risk Analysis -- 10.7. San Francisco Public Utilities Commission SCADA Redundancy -- 10.7.1. Redundancy as a Resiliency Mechanism -- 10.7.2. Risk Reduction and Resource Allocation -- 10.8. Analysis -- 10.9. Exercises -- 11. Water and Water Treatment -- 11.1. From Germs to Terrorists -- 11.1.1. SDWA -- 11.1.2. Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center -- 11.2. Foundations: SDWA of 1974 -- 11.3. Bioterrorism Act of 2002. 11.3.1. Is Water for Drinking? -- 11.4. Architecture of Water Systems -- 11.4.1. Law of the River -- 11.5. Hetch Hetchy Network -- 11.5.1. Betweenness Analysis -- 11.6. Cascade Analysis -- 11.6.1. Multidimensional Analysis -- 11.6.2. Blocking Nodes -- 11.7. Hetch Hetchy Investment Strategies -- 11.7.1. Rational Actor Attacker -- 11.8. Hetch Hetchy Threat Analysis -- 11.8.1. Chem -- Bio Threats -- 11.8.2. Earthquake Threats -- 11.8.3. Allocation to Harden Threat -- Asset Pairs -- 11.9. Analysis -- 11.10. Exercises -- References -- 12. Energy -- 12.1. Energy Fundamentals -- 12.2. Regulatory Structure of the Energy Sector -- 12.2.1. Evolution of Energy Regulation -- 12.2.2. Other Regulation -- 12.2.3. Electric Sector ISAC -- 12.3. Interdependent Coal -- 12.3.1. Interdependency with Transportation -- 12.4. Rise of Oil and the Automobile -- 12.4.1. Oil -- 12.4.2. Ng -- 12.5. Energy Supply Chains -- 12.5.1. Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts -- 12.5.2. Refineries -- 12.5.3. Transmission -- 12.5.4. Transport4. 12.5.5. Storage -- 12.5.6. NG Supply Chains -- 12.5.7. SCADA -- 12.6. Critical Gulf of Mexico Cluster -- 12.6.1. Refineries -- 12.6.2. Transmission Pipelines -- 12.6.3. Storage -- 12.7. Threat Analysis of the Gulf of Mexico Supply Chain -- 12.8. Network Analysis of the Gulf of Mexico Supply Chain -- 12.9. KeystoneXL Pipeline Controversy -- 12.10. NG Supply Chain -- 12.11. Analysis -- 12.12. Exercises -- References -- 13. Electric Power -- 13.1. Grid -- 13.2. From Death Rays to Vertical Integration -- 13.2.1. Early Regulation -- 13.2.2. Deregulation and EPACT 1992 -- 13.2.3. Energy Sector ISAC -- 13.3. Out of Orders 888 and 889 Comes Chaos -- 13.3.1. Economics versus Physics -- 13.3.2. Betweenness Increases SOC -- 13.4. North American Grid -- 13.4.1. ACE and Kirchhoff's Law -- 13.5. Anatomy of a Blackout -- 13.5.1. What Happened on August 14th, 2003 -- 13.6. Threat Analysis -- 13.6.1. Attack Scenario 1: Disruption of Fuel Supply to Power Plants -- 13.6.2. Attack Scenario 2: Destruction of Major Transformers. 13.6.3. Attack Scenario 3: Disruption of SCADA Communications -- 13.6.4. Attack Scenario 4: Creation of a Cascading Transmission Failure -- 13.7. Risk Analysis -- 13.8. Analysis of WECC -- 13.9. Analysis -- 13.10. Exercises -- References -- 14. Healthcare and Public Health -- 14.1. Sector Plan -- 14.2. Roemer's Model -- 14.2.1. Components of Roemer's Model -- 14.3. Complexity of Public Health -- 14.4. Risk Analysis of HPH Sector -- 14.5. Bioterrorism -- 14.5.1. Classification of Biological Agents -- 14.6. Epidemiology -- 14.6.1. Kermack -- McKendrick Model -- 14.6.2. SARS -- 14.7. Predicting Pandemics -- 14.7.1. Levy Right Theory of Pandemics -- 14.8. Biosurveillance -- 14.8.1. Healthmap -- 14.8.2. Big Data. 16.1.3. Perils of Efficient Supply Chains -- 16.2. WTW -- 16.2.1. Economic Contagions -- 16.3. Risk Assessment -- 16.3.1. MSRAM -- 16.3.2. PROTECT -- 16.4. Analysis -- 16.5. Exercises -- References -- 17. Banking and Finance -- 17.1. Financial System -- 17.1.1. Federal Reserve versus U.S. Treasury -- 17.1.2. Operating the System -- 17.1.3. Balancing the Balance Sheet -- 17.1.4. Paradox of Enrichment -- 17.2. Financial Networks -- 17.2.1. FedWire -- 17.2.2. TARGET -- 17.2.3. SWIFT -- 17.2.4. Credit Card Networks -- 17.2.5. 3-D Secure Payment -- 17.3. Virtual Currency -- 17.4. Hacking the Financial Network -- 17.5. Hot Money -- 17.5.1. Dutch Disease -- 17.6. End of Stimulus? -- 17.7. Fractal Markets -- 17.7.1. EMH -- 17.7.2. FMH -- 17.7.3. Predicting Collapse -- 17.8. Exercises -- References -- Appendix A Math: Probability Primer -- A.1. A Priori Probability -- A.2. A Posteriori Probability. A.3. Random Networks -- A.4. Conditional Probability -- A.5. Bayesian Networks -- A.6. Bayesian Reasoning -- References -- Further Reading -- Appendix B Math: Risk and Resilience -- B.1. EUT -- B.1.1. Fault Trees -- B.1.2. Fault Tree Minimization -- B.1.3. XOR Fault Tree Allocation Algorithm -- B.2. Bayesian Estimation -- B.2.1. Bayesian Networks -- B.3. Exceedence Probability and Probable Maximum Loss Risk -- B.3.1. Modeling EP -- B.3.2. Estimating EP from Data -- B.3.3. How to Process Time-Series Data -- B.4. Network Risk -- B.5. MBRA -- B.5.1. Network Resource Allocation -- B.5.2. Simulation -- B.5.3. Cascade Risk -- B.5.4. Flow Risk -- References -- Appendix C Math: Spectral Radius -- C.1. Network as Matrix -- C.2. Matrix Diagonalization -- C.3. Relationship to Risk and Resilience -- C.3.1. Equation 1 -- C.3.2. Equation 2 -- Appendix D Math: Tragedy of the Commons -- D.1. Lotka -- Volterra Model -- D.2. Hopf -- Holling Model. Access restricted to subscribing institutions. Individual titles purchased upon selection by the 7th affiliated user. Electronic reproduction. Perth, W.A. Available via World Wide Web. Book preview interface supplies PDF, image or read-aloud access. Adobe Digital Editions software required for book downloads. Users at some libraries may be required to establish an individual no-charge EBL account, and log in to access the full text. For security, do not use a confidential or important ID and password to log in; create a different username and password. |
|---|---|
| Physical Description: |
1 online resource (xix, 376 pages). |
| Format: |
Book preview interface supplies PDF, image or read-aloud access. Adobe Digital Editions software required for book downloads. Users at some libraries may be required to establish an individual no-charge EBL account, and log in to access the full text. For security, do not use a confidential or important ID and password to log in; create a different username and password. |
| Bibliography: |
Includes bibliographical references at the end of each chapters and index. |
| ISBN: |
9781118817704 1118817702 |
| Access: |
Access restricted to subscribing institutions. Individual titles purchased upon selection by the 7th affiliated user. |