The morality of embryo use

Is it permissible to use a human embryo in stem cell research, or in general as a means for the benefit of others? Acknowledging each embryo as an object of moral concern, Louis M.Guenin argues that it is morally permissible to decline intrauterine transfer of an embryo formed outside the body, and...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Guenin, Louis M., 1950-
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Physical Description:
x, 273 pages ; 24 cm.
Subjects:
Life and death, Power over.
Fetus -- Research -- Moral and ethical aspects.
Human embryo -- Therapeutic use -- Moral and ethical aspects.
Online Access:Contributor biographical information -
Contents:
  • Preface
  • 1. Preliminaries
  • 1.1. Embryo use
  • 1.2. The biological context
  • 1.3. Affected beings and utilitarianism
  • 1.4. A computational Waterloo
  • 2. Epidosembryos
  • 2.1. The universe of concern
  • 2.2. The set of eligible subjects
  • 2.3. The argument from nonenablement
  • (a) Developmental potential and discretionary action
  • (b) Permissibility of declining intrauterine transfer
  • (c) Collective redistribution indefensible
  • (d) No possible person corresponds to an epidosembryo
  • (e) Epidosembryo personhood untenable
  • (f) Fulfilling the collective duty of beneficence
  • 2.4. Other defenses of embryo use distinguished
  • 2.5. Two subsets, one justification
  • 2.6. Replies to objections relating to potential
  • 2.7. In service of humanitarian ends
  • 3. Individuation
  • 3.1. The ontological challenge
  • 3.2. Identity
  • 3.3. Understanding individuation
  • 3.4. Arguments against early embryonic individuality
  • (a) Demanding indivisibility
  • (b) Embryo splitting and personal identity
  • (c) Totipotency of blastomere components
  • 3.5. Divisibility and personhood
  • 3.6. Individuality further considered
  • (a) Individuality within alternative ontologies
  • (b) Categories and kinds of creatures
  • (c) The embryo as organism
  • (d) Other resources
  • 3.7. Where matters remain
  • 4. Respect for specific life
  • 4.1. The species problem
  • 4.2. Species as universals
  • 4.3. Species as structures
  • 4.4. Properties
  • (a) Kripke's causal theory of reference
  • (b) Putnam's theory of reference
  • (c) Homeostatic property cluster natural kinds
  • (d) Essentialism for species-corresponding kinds
  • 4.5. Taxa
  • 4.6. Bearers of morally crucial properties
  • 4.7. Species partiality
  • 4.8. Inferences within theistic ethics
  • 5. Consensus
  • 5.1. Public reason
  • 5.2. Kantian morality
  • 5.3. The Catholic magisterium
  • (a) Two doctrines
  • (b) The first nineteen centuries
  • (c) Assertion of immediate animation
  • (d) Prescinding from the timing of animation
  • 5.4. Arguments concerning personhood
  • (a) From genome to person
  • (b) Lack of a nonarbitrary beginning
  • (c) Possibility of a soul
  • 5.5. Support for epidosembryo use
  • (a) The social duties
  • (b) Inferring divine will
  • (c) Charity and assisted reproduction
  • (d) Escape from a dilemma
  • (e) Protecting a related stance
  • 5.6. Recognizing common ground
  • 6. Clones
  • 6.1. Nonreprocloning
  • 6.2. The teleological objection
  • 6.3. Reprocloning
  • (a) Hazards
  • (b) Nonsafety objections
  • (c) Considering probable incidence
  • (d) Assessing the objections
  • (e) Prohibition and privacy
  • 6.4. Strategic prohibition of nonreprocloning
  • 7. Analyzing alternatives
  • 7.1. Putative noncomplicity
  • 7.2. Studying the developed human
  • 7.3. Procuring pluripotent cells
  • 7.4. Parthenotes
  • 8. Shaping norms
  • 8.1. Gifts and consents
  • 8.2. Public support
  • 8.3. Oocyte contributions
  • 8.4. Ectogenesis
  • 8.5. Hybrids and chimeras
  • 8.6. Pleonexia and patents
  • Bibliography
  • Index.

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