| Call Number (LC) | Title | Results |
|---|---|---|
| S 1.163/2:12-1 | Actions needed to better assess and coordinate capacity-building efforts at the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-2 | Better planning and oversight could have reduced construction delays and costs at the Kabul Military Training Center | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-3 | Afghan National Security University has experienced cost growth and schedule delays, and contract administration needs improvement | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-4 | DOD improved its accountability for vehicles provided to the Afghan national security forces, but should follow up on end-use monitoring findings | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-6 | Afghan First initiative has placed work with Afghan companies, but is affected by inconsistent contract solicitation and vetting, and employment data is limited | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-7 | C-JTSCC has taken steps to improve the accuracy of its contract data, but it should assess the feasibility of correcting data for fiscal year 2009 and earlier | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-9 |
USAID spent almost $400 million on an Afghan stabilization project despite uncertain results, but has taken steps to better assess similar efforts USAID has disbursed $9.5 billion for reconstruction and funded some financial audits as required, but many audits face significant delays, accountability limitations, and lack of resources |
2 |
| S 1.163/2:12-10 | Increases in security costs are likely under the Afghan public protection force USAID needs to monitor costs and ensure unlicensed security providers are not used | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-11 | Progress made toward increased stability under USAID's Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative-East Program but transition to long term development efforts not yet achieved | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-12 | Fiscal Year 2011 Afghanistan infrastructure fund projects are behind schedule and lack adequate sustainment plans | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:12-13 | Selected public diplomacy awards mostly achieved objectives, but embassy can take steps to enhance grant management and oversight | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:13-1 | Afghan National Security Forces facilities : concerns with funding, oversight, and sustainability for operation and maintenance | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:13-2 | Afghanistan's national power utility : $12.8 million in DoD-purchased equipment sits unused, and USAID paid a contractor for work not done | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:13-3 | Afghan Police vehicle maintenance contract : actions needed to prevent millions of dollars from being wasted | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:13-4 | Afghan National Army : controls over fuel for vehicles, generators, and power plants need strengthening to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:13-6 | Contracting with the enemy : DOD has limited assurance that contractors with links to enemy groups are identified and their contracts terminated | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:13-13 | Afghan Special Mission Wing : DOD moving forward with $771.8 million purchase of aircraft that Afghans cannot operate or maintain | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:14-1 | Afghan National Police fuel program : concerted efforts needed to strengthen oversight of U.S. funds | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:16-46 | Afghanistan's Information and Communications Technology sector : U.S. agencies obligated over $2.6 billion to the sector, but the full scope of U.S. efforts is unknown | 1 |
| S 1.163/2:16-49 | Afghan National Army : DOD has taken steps to remedy poor management of vehicle maintenance program | 1 |