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Interim report on projects to develop the Iraqi Special Operational Forces

Main Author:	United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Format:	Electronic
Language:	English
Published:	Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, [2010]
Physical Description:	1 online resource (15 pages).
Series:	Audit report (United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction) ; report no. 10-009.
Subjects:	National security -- Iraq. Special forces (Military science) -- Iraq. Terrorism -- Iraq -- Prevention.
Online Access:	https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo4531

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In Prospector

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